The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the stringent bail conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) must “yield and recede into the background” where an accused has suffered prolonged pre-trial incarceration, the trial is procrastinating and the delay is not attributable to the accused.Justice Sumeet Goel made the observation while granting regular bail in an Enforcement Directorate case.“In such cases of inordinate delay, the strict fulfillment of the conditions under Section 45 of PMLA must yield and recede into the background,” Justice Goel ruled, adding that relief on the ground of prolonged incarceration was not based on a relaxed interpretation of the PMLA, but on an independent constitutional right flowing directly from Article 21.“While considering a plea for bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration, the relief is not premised upon a relaxed interpretation of the statute, but upon an independent, non-negotiable right stemming directly from Article 21,” Justice Goel asserted, further adding that the right originated from the Constitution, which was the “grundnorm”.The Bench made it clear that no legislative enactment could “erect a wall high enough to exclude the operation of constitutional remedies”. The Court held that a regular bail plea on merits in a PMLA case was required to satisfy Section 45, but drew a distinction where bail was sought because of long incarceration and the constitutional guarantee under Article 21.The petitioner in the matter was represented by senior advocates Randeep S Rai and Chetan Mittal, along with advocates Rubina Virmani, Tarun Kumar Hooda and Shifali Goyal.“A regular bail plea on merits, in respect of an offence under the PMLA Act, is essentially required to meet with the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA Act,” the court observed.But position changed where the plea was founded on prolonged incarceration in circumstances where the accused has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial was procrastinating and the delay was not attributable to him.“The rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA Act pale into oblivion when regular bail is sought for on account of long incarceration in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-applicant has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial is procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-applicant,” Justice Goel observed.The Court specifically declined to prescribe any fixed period after which incarceration would breach the sacrosanct threshold of Article 21.Justice Goel said personal liberty could not be governed by “mathematical formulas or rigid, mechanical arithmetic” and there could be neither a straight-jacket formula nor a fixed statutory clock.“There can neither be a straight-jacket formula, nor a fixed statutory clock that automatically signals when under-trial detention ceases to be lawful custody and degenerates into unconstitutional punishment.”“The threshold of ‘one-half/one-third of maximum punishment prescribed’ provided for in Section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNSS, constitutes minimum statutory requirement of mandatory relief therein, it cannot be treated as a pre-condition for the exercise of Constitutional/inherent jurisdiction where the continued detention is otherwise rendered unjust or disproportionate,” Justice Goel asserted.The Court went further to hold that where the trial was proceeding at a snail’s pace, the prosecution was exhibiting avoidable inertia and the prospects of a timely verdict were purely illusory, such incarceration could be held unduly prolonged irrespective of whether the one-half/one-third period has been completed.At the same time, the Court made it clear that there could be no exhaustive guidelines for determining when under-trial confinement crossed the constitutional threshold. It said the determination had to depend on the facts of each case and judicial discretion.“There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of exercise of power by a Court, while determining whether the period of incarceration, warrants an interference under Article 21 of the Constitution, shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down…”The Bench noted that the petitioner had approached the High Court for regular bail in an ED case. “The gravamen of the allegations emerging from the ECIR and the prosecution complaint was that a real estate company, along with its promoters and directors, including the present petitioner, collected substantial amounts from home buyers and financial institutions in the name of various residential and commercial projects”.Justice Goel further noted ED’s allegation was that the amount so collected was not utilized for the received purposes. The Court found that the petitioner had been arrested on July 22, 2025, and had remained in judicial custody for one year and 22 days.The ED had completed its investigation and filed the prosecution complaint on September 19, 2025; consequently, the investigation qua the petitioner stood concluded, with nothing on record indicating that further custodial interrogation was required or contemplated.